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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
J. HARO·LD MITCHELL, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
ARROWHEAD FREIGHT LINES, L'TD., 
a corporation, and MAR\7JN C. VA·N 
PATTEN, 
Appellxunts. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTiS 
STEW ART, CANNON & HANS;ON 
E. ·F. BAL'D·WIN, J·R. 
Attorneys for DefendamJf).s 
,OJI'IAl A ppellarnts 
Case No. 
7·242 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT:S 
ANNUITY TABLES 
~Counsel acknowledges that there was no direct evi-
dence in this case that there was any permanen1t mate-
~rml impairment ·of a swbstantiJal nature in p~laintiff's 
etvrnim.g capacity as required under the Pauley case 
before the annuity tables could he introduced in evi-
dence. His only argument is that plaintiff's injuries 
were of such nature that he might be unable to carry 
· on his avocation as a school teacher. The sole handicap 
argued was that he might be hampered in his ability 
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to talk; howev.er, there is nothing in the evidence to 
that effect. The fact that plaintiff admittedly was teach-
ing Sunday school and singing in a choral group and 
taking p1art in the ordinary activities of life (Tr. 353) 
proved to the contrary. This uncontradicted evidence 
and plaintiff's ability to testify without difficulty at th~ 
trial shows ther.e is no merit to counsel's ·contention, 
which is who~ly unsupported hy the evidence. 
Of the seven doctors called to testify, five of whom 
were called as plaintiff's witnesses, none testified that 
plaintiff either was, or would he unable to resume his 
occupation as a school teacher. 
'The only statement of any lay witness on the matter 
was that of plaintiff, who te·S'tified: "I didn't want to try 
to continue my school work ~at the present !time. I just 
simply feel like I couldn't handle it this year." (Tr. 
332). P~aintiff was still planning on resuming his school 
work at the time of the trial. This he never denied. 
Plaintiff outlines at great length evidence relating 
to his injuries, most of which had healed or were com-
pletely repaired ev.en at the time of trial. The only in-
juries which could permanently affect plaintiff's. earn-
ing cai>'acity· would necessarily have to he permanent imr 
juries of such a nature and character as to be prohibitiv.e 
of his resuming his occupation. 
As a matter of fact, plaintiff began to resume his 
ordinary activities as early as thirteen days after the 
accident fol~owing that period of hospitalization. He 
was attended for a short whiLe thereafter by Dr. Butler 
at Safford, Arizona from April 22nd to May 16, 1947 
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(Tr. 281). He had then recovered snfficientl~' that he 
did not need the assistance of Dr. Butler to the tin1e he 
left Safford June 1947, and finished all his routine \York 
before he left .£_.Uizona ( Tr. 283). Other than tl1e fix-
ing of his teeth, he thereafter required no further Inedical 
attention than the exan1inations made by Dr. Richards 
and Dr. Clegg. 
In his enthusiasm, Counsel suggests such things as 
arthritis. There was no evidence that plaintiff had even 
a sign or trace of this disease, which normally comes 
from age rather than trauma. The only m·ention or ref-
erence to arthritis was in the taking of Dr. But!ler's de-
position at Safford, Arizona, which was read at the trial. 
In that deposition, Dr. Butler had made a voluntary 
statement that arthritis sometimes follows injury or 
fractures involving a joint of a vertebrae-. Our objection 
and motion to strike such voluntary statement should, 
in our opinion, have been granted by the lower court 
('See Tr. 272). We would have insisted further that 
such reference to arthritis be stricken, hut the trial court 
assured us the record was cleared up by the cross-exami-
nation developed in the deposition. W·e quote: 
'' Q. But you did not see anything that indi-
cated that ( refering to arthritis) in any of 
his joints~ 
A. No, sir. 
MR. CANNON: Now, at that point, your 
Honor, we would likp to move to strike the 
doctor's statement on Page 17, wher·ein he 
referred to arthritis, since he now testifies 
he found no arthritis. 
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MR. WHITE : Of cours·e, your Honor, we 
resist _the motion, as it is a condition which 
may develop in the future according to the 
doctor. 
· MR. ·CANNON: That is }JUre speculation. 
THE COUR.T: WeU, it's-that is just 
part of your cross examination; it shows now 
. that he hasn't amy. The motion is denied." 
(Tr. 282-3). 
Of all the doctors who examined plaintiff from t~e 
beginning through the trial, none was able to discover 
even a t:r:ace of arthritis. Of the numerous x-rays taken 
~nd the physical examinati~ns made, including those of 
Dr. Clegg and Dr. Broadbent, all were entirely negative 
as to arthritis~ Plain tiff. himself made no such claim. 
·-
The matter was undisputed. 
P~ain tiff's claims of fractures in the vertebrae are 
equally unfounded.- While it is true that Dr. Butler 
suggested a fracture in the joint of the- first cervical~ 
verte hra:e, and this apparently was the basis of his con-
clusion as to any permanent injury to the· neek, we 
pointed out in our original brief, and again here I!len-
tion, that even if a fracture could have existed, (and 
the sev~ral other doctors all testified there was none} 
it was necessarily healed and repaired itself, and it is 
entirely clear from the record that there was no per-
manent injury to the neck on account of the fractures. 
The limitation of motion, if any, was. necessari~y based 
on injury to ~the soft tissue. 
Respondent emphasizes such things as impairment 
of breathing. Plaintiff admitted testifying in his de-
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position that his breathing 'Ya.s '~pretty much all right 
no,v,'' and added: '~It is quite definitely cleared up.'' 
(Tr. 344). 
The careful and thorough examinations conducted 
by Dr. Clegg at plaintiff's request, other than the Inod-
erate limitation of motion of the neck and jaws, sho,ved 
a hBaled fracture of the left mandible, healed ·scar of the 
left ear, area of anesthesia about the left ear and left 
side of the chin, healed rib fracture, hBa[,ed fracture of 
the nasal 'bone, and anklyosis, partial fibrous slight of 
left thumb. (Tr. 290-1, 305). All ex-rays showed the 
bony structures to be in good alignment and good appo-
sition. ·The possibility of a chip fracture, the evidence 
clearly shows, could not have affected or limited the 
motion of plaintiff's neck. 
We wish to correct the transcript page on page 15 
of our brief, whereiJI reference is made to the testimony 
of Dr. Broadbent where he says there was no evidence of 
a skull fracture. The transcript page should 'be 2215 
rather than 223. _ 
So far as any permanent disabi~ity was concerned, 
that was limited to the two possibilities, that of moderate 
limitation of motion in the neck and jaws, s.o the ques-
tion is really reduced to whether moderate limitation of 
motion in the neck and jaws would prevent plaintiff from 
resuming his occupation in the teaching p·rof.ession. 
The demand for teachers at the present time is 
great. We submit there is no evidence in this case 
that plaintiff could not resume his occupation. The 
evidence is that he was intending to do so. 
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Similarly, no proof was offered by plaintiff as to 
any permanent impairment of earning cap~acity as to 
the ranch, and no claim of such proof was made at the 
time of oral argument before this court. There was no 
evidence that plaintiff had any earning capacity in con-
nection therewith. Furthermore, if plaintiff intended 
to restin1e his occupation as a teacher, he would not 
then have n1ore time than to supervise or manage the 
ranch. At 1east, there is no evidence but what that would 
consume all his time, especially if he continued in such 
community activities as teaching Sunday ,School and 
singing with his choral group. 
The original claim by plaintiff's amended complaint. 
was $3,000 nece-ssitated by the employment of others on 
the ranch (Tr. 23). The only evidence was that $'900 
was paid a brother June to December the year of the 
accident. How much of this would have 'been paid had 
the accident not occurred was not shown. 'The disturb-
ing feature, however, is how counsel just after the court 
at the conclusion of the trial overruled our final motion 
to strike the annuity tab~es and just as the instructions 
were to he read to the jury, seized upon the opportunity 
to quietly withdraw his claim for $900 wages paid. To 
this procedure, we normally would have no objection; 
however, we were led to believe that this item of special 
damage was withdrawn because of lack of proof. In 
withdrawing the $900 item, which ·counsel does no~ deny, 
he could only have had two possible r,easons for so do-
ing: Either he was thereby admitting there was no proof 
· but that the $900 would have been p~aid notwithstanding 
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the accident, or, secondly, it was a deliberate act adr(~i~ly 
enacted to cause the jury to confuse the 1natter of pay-:-
ment of wages w·ith "per1nanent impairment of earning· 
capacity of the plaintiff.'' We are now convinced it 
was the 1atter. We are not unaw·are that it cannot be 
presumed 'vithout proof that the jury arrived at its 
verdict in a certain manner; however, neither can it be 
assumed that the jurors did not use the annuity tables 
to the prejudice of defendants. It does app·ear that the 
jury used the figure, $1'6,-591.72, being $100 a month for 
life at four per cent interest. Under the circumstances, 
particularly when no foundation was laid for admissi-
bility of the tables, we are satisfied the jurors were mis-
led and awarded plaintiff $100 a month upon a wrong 
theory, namely, that plaintiff p·aid his brother an aver-
age of about $100 per month for work on the farm for 
the term April to December, 1946, a period of nine 
months, or a total of $900. 
It is not only reasonable to believe that that is how 
the jury arrived at the verdict, but it is the most pro'bable 
manner in which it would s.o arrive at its verdict; This 
is particu'larly so when the matter of earning capacity 
was confused by the court's instruction No. 17 (Tr. 74-
75) wherein the court instructed th·e jury that plaintiff 
was entitled to ''comp·ensation for his actual loss of vp1ast 
e(]JfniJngs, if any, and for impairment of earning cap~acity, 
if any, which will diminish his capacity to earn money . 
in the future.'' Exception was taken to this instruction 
as a whole, and also sp·ecific exception wa.s taken to the 
words ''past earnings'' in line four of the fourth para-
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graph; also to the words ''and for any impair1nent of 
earning capacity, if any, which will diminish his capacity 
to earn money in the fut'ure. '' ( Tr. 545). The trial court 
recognized this error, that is, the portion referring to 
past earnifngs and the confusion it might cause, iparticu-
larly when the evidence relating to the $900 paid plain-
tiff's brother was not eliminated so far as the jurors 
were concerned. 'The jury was not instructed to dis-
regard that evi~ence in any written instruction or ora1 
instruction by the court. Counsel for plaintiff not only 
himself injected this error into the record through his 
requested instruction No. 5 ( Tr. 112-3), but refused the-
offer of the trial court to have the jury called back and 
the instruction modified to cure the error. He elected to 
take his chances, knowing that this mistake was in the 
record. He did not want the jury further instructed 
about the matter because it would destroy the effective-
ness of the annuity tables. 
At page 37 of our original brief, we mentioned that 
four of the last five figures of the verdict were identical 
with the figure $16,-59'1.72 (adopted from the table). We 
should have said that three of the last five figures of 
the ve-rdict, that is, $·2!1,59'4.22 compared with the figure 
taken from the annuity table; however, when the special 
damages are tota~led, that is, $1638.50 added to $1264.00 
and the figure from the annuity table, $1·6,5'91.72, in-
cluded, the total is exactly $2'lOO~oo less than the total 
verdict, or $19,494.22. Note tha.t three of th·e last four 
'-
figures are identical with the figure taken fron1 the 
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annuity table, and that the last four figures are identical 
"\Yith the total a1nount of the verdict. 
The affidavits of the jurors offered to prove a 
quotient verdict show that as to the figure of $12100, 
$1200 "\Yas for pain and suffering and $900 wages paid 
by plaintiff to his brother, although the latter figure was 
never sub1nitted to the jury. The only special damage 
submitted to the jury were $1264 damage to -plaintiff's 
truck, and $1638.50 for hospital, medical and traveling 
expenses (Tr. 116, 76). 
Perhaps this court feels that the affidavits cannot 
be used for any purpose other than showing a quotient 
verdict. However, it is our contention that the affidavits 
filed by us in clear, concise and unmistakable terms show-
ed a quotient verdict, and that if the jurors did thereafter 
dispute their first affidavits or attempt to explain them, 
the reason is undoubtedly accounted for in that they 
were then put on notice of the invalidity of the verdict 
through opposing counsel, and attempted to make coun-
ter-affidavits in their own defense. The original affi-
davits were in clear, concis·e and unmistakable language 
ood were and are, we submit, sufficient to show a quo-
tient verdict. As they were offered and received for 
one purpose, they are properly before the court on this 
app1eal. 
Even if the affidavits are not considered, this much 
is a reasonable certainty, that not more than $2100 was 
allowed for pain and suffering, and that part of the ver-
dict, namely, the figure $16,5'91.72, was not a proper 
~e~ement of damage in this case. 
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Nor do we believe it should be necessary for appel .. 
la.nts in this case to prove that the tables actually op-
erated to their prejudice· when the verdict was exorbitant 
and excessive and when prejudice is presumed to result 
from improper ·evidence, the natural and probable ten-
dency of which is to enhance the verdict. 
Couns~l for ·plaintiff freely acknowledges that the 
tables V{ere offered and intended to be used to enhance 
the verdict and makes no contention that they were not 
harmful to defendants, if not improperly admitted. 
Counsel does ca~l attention to Section 104-39-3, Utah 
Code Annotated 1943, which provides: 
''No exception shall be regarded, unless the 
decision excepted to is material and p·rejudicial to 
·the ·substantial rights of the party exeepting." 
Substantially the same provision is found in Section 
104-14-7. In construing the latter section, this court in 
Jensen v. Utjah R.y. C·o., 72 Utah 3'616, __ 2}0 Pac. 349, points 
out ~t page 400 of the Utah Reports that where errors 
are shown by appellant which are merely abstract or 
on th~ir face immaterial, or otherwise are not in and of 
themselves calculated to do harm, then appellant in order 
to show reversible error must show hy the record that 
it resulted to his prejudice in some substantial right. 
However said the -court: 
''Where the committed error is of such nature 
or character as calculated to do harm,· or on its 
face as having the natural tendency to do so, pre-
judice will he presum·ed, until hy the record it 
is affirmatively shown that the error was not 
or could not have been of harmful effect. Thus, 
if the app·ellant shows committed error of such 
10 
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nature or character, he, in the first instance, has 
1nade a prin1a facie show·ing of prejudice. The 
burden, or rather the duty of going forward, is 
then cast on the respondent to show by the record 
that the committed error 'vas not, or could not 
haYe been, of harmful effect.'' 
To the same effect see Clark r. Los Angeles & 8. L. 
R. c.o., 73 Utah 486, 27;1 Pac. 582, at page 502 of the 
Utah Report. 
In Littledike v. Wood, 69 Utah 323, 255 Pac. 172, 
the suit \Yas for personal injuries and also damages in 
the nature of loss of time or of earnings or imp,airment 
of earning capacity. In holding there wa.s insufficient 
proof ~f in1pairment of earning cap~city· or loss of in-
come and in granting a new trial, the court said: 
"But the other point, that there -is no evi-
dence upon which compensation for loss of time 
may be ascertained or measur-ed with reasonaple · 
or any degree of certainty, is more serious.· All 
the evidence there is on the subject is that the 
respondent was confined in the hospital· for sev-
erat weeks by reason of his injuries; that .his 
ribs· gave him 'trouble yet,.' and hurt him ·when 
he did hard work; and that he could not do a· 
day's work as he did before. But no evidence 
was given· as to the occupation or ·earning capa-
city or earnings of the respondent, nor as to the 
value of the time lost or as to what earnings, or 
the amount or value thereof, were lost by him, 
nor ari.y evidence to measure the damage or the 
loss sustained by him in such respect. Under 
such circumstance, the authorities teach that it 
was error to direct the jury, as was done, that 
they had the right to and should ·take into con-
sideration the time lost hy the respondent in as-
11 
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sessing the amount of damag·es. * * * There be-
ing here no evidence as to the value of the time 
lost by respondent., nor any ·evidence by which 
such value could be ascertained or de~termined~ 
any allowance made by the jury for loss of time 
of necessity would rest on mere speculation and 
conj·ecture. We are also of the opinion that the 
ruling was prejudicial, for it cannot he told how 
much, if anything, the jury allowed for loss of 
time. It is but speculation that the jury did not 
a~low anything, and if they made an allowance 
it again is but sp·eculation as to how much they 
allowed. Candland v. Mellen, 46 Utah 519, 151 
P. 341. The ·e.rroneous charge w!as error wltWh 
w~as oalcuZated to d;o harm, and in such case 'pre-
judice ·will be presumed until by the r.ecord it is 
shown that the error w~as not or could wo·t have 
be:en harmful.'' 
Similarly in the instant ease, the annuity tables 
were calculated to ·enhance the verdict and they were 
not admissible under the rule of the Pauley case. 
We made rep.eated objections before the trial court 
to the us·e of the annuity tables, based upon the grounds 
that they were incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, 
that there was insufficient foundation laid, and that the 
tables offered were not in proper form, and that they 
assumed facts which were not in evidence. (Tr. 405, 
418, 410, 411, 412, ·541). We asked leave of court at 
several stages during the trial for permission to argue 
the question of admissibility of the annuity tables be-
cause no semblance of a foundation was either laid or 
attempted. !The court for the purpose of the record did 
allow our objections to go to the entire line of that evi-
dence. 
12 
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....-\ny conclusion that plaintiff's earning oapacity was 
vpernzan.en:f'ly hnpai.red to any extent, much less a sub-
stantial extent as required under the rule of the Pauley 
case, \vould have to be based entirely upon assun1ptions 
and inferences not founded on any evidence. We again 
call attention to the total lack of any evidence of per-
manent impair1nent of earning capacity as outlined in 
our original brief at pages 26-30. Inference cannot be 
predieated upon inference. 
In our original brief, we pointed out other objec-
tions to the annuity tables offered in this case. While 
\ve .do not \Vant to unduly repeat, we feel such matters 
should not be overlooked. Even if the tables were ad-
missible in the first instance, it would be improper to 
per1nit the jury to use plaintiff's fuli life exp·ectancy 
because he was intending while getting his ranch going, 
to lay off school for a year or two, or at least for a 
substantial period. During this time, he could not be 
out anything so far as his teaching profession was con-
cerned. Then on the other end of his life expectancy, 
there was the retirement age for school teachers at ages 
fifty-five and sixty (See Section 75-29-44, Utah Code 
Annotated 1943), so the jury should not in any event 
have been permitted to use plaintiff's full life expect-
ancy, which was incorporated into the table without any 
qualification. (See table, page B2 App. Br. and cases 
cited, pages 33-34). 
The court's unwiilingness to give our objections any 
consideration in a matter of such importance as the an-
nuity tables, which are always damaging to the defense, 
13 
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and counsel's deliberate and persistent efforts in. insist-
ing on the use of such evidence, without any proper sup-
porting evidence or foundation laid hurt, and defe:r;td-
ants were thereby deprived of a fair trial on the issue of 
damages. 
ERRONEOUS INSTRUC:TJ~ONS 
Respondent contends the errors committed in the 
giving of the court's instructions No. 6 and No. 7, were 
not prejudicial, and that defendants did not take proper 
exceptions as to the latter instruction. 
The Court's Instruction No. 7 
Five separate exceptions were taken to this instruc-
tion, one to the W'hO'le thereof, and four other specific 
portions. To assist the court in ohs·erving the specific 
objections ('Tr. ;544-'5), we have placed parentheses 
around the words to which specific excepition was taken 
as follows: 
"You are instructed that the laws of this 
state provide that no vehicle shall be driven to 
the ~eft side of the center of the roadway in over-
taking and passing another vehicle traveling in 
the same direction, ( vwnless such left side is cZ{!)(J;rrl;y 
visible and is free of ~oncoming itlrnaffic fo'r a suf-
ficient dista;nce .ahead to permit such ~overtak'ing 
~and passing to be oomplet.ely made witloout in-
terferilng with the safe op•erotion oflamt!J ve.hicle 
approa.ching from the opposite d~re:ctvon of OJWY 
vehicle ov.ert1aken.) (In every ev.ent, the over1tlak-
ing vehJicle must return t1o the right hand side of 
the roadw'a;y before oomilng withm 1one htwrt'dred 
feet of any vehicle .appro,aching from the opposite 
direction.) 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
''If you shall find and believe fron1 a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the defendants op-
erated the .... Urowhead truck and trailer upon U. S. 
High"'"ay 91, and attempted to overtake another 
Yehicle proceeding in the same direction at a time 
'''"hen the left side of said high,vay was not clearly 
visible and was not free fron1 oncoming traffic 
for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such 
oYertaking and passing- to be eon1pletely 1nade 
"~ithout interfering 'vith the safe operation of the 
Yehicle approaching froin the opposite direction, 
'vhich 'vas being driven by the plaintiff, (then 
yo'zt are inst rue ted that such cond!uct ·on the par1.t 
of. the defendants was negligent arnd in violation 
of the tra.ffic lau's of thJis st~ate), (and if you 
shaU fu.rther find fnom a prepJondBtYJmce of the 
. evidence that such neglig·ence W 1as the p~roximate 
oause of the collision between p~lailntiff' s piahup 
truck and said Ar11owhead truck and t~ai~er, then 
you -should· fixnd the issues in favor-of the plaint~ff 
and a,gai!Jist the defend;a;n.ts.) '' (Tr. 64). 
To hold _that_ defendants' exceptio~s were not suf-
ficient would be to override the clear provisions of Sec-:-
tion 104-24-18, which sp·ecifi~ally provides: ''That no 
reasons need be given for such exceptions.'' ·,This is 
true especialiy when the erroneous instruction was 
drafted hy counsel for plaintiff and insisted upon by 
him and given by th~e court in the exact form requested 
over defendants' several specific exceptions~ 
-We still insist the instruction is erroneous not only 
in its entirety, hut also as to the particular parts to which 
exception was duly taken. 
In his brief, respondent overlooked one of the most 
objectionable features to this instruction, namely, that 
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the court in ·giving the same thereby adopted and in-
jected the provisions of Sect~on '57 -7-124 of the Utah 
Motor Vehicle Code without any qualification or proper 
application of the same to the evidence. The instruction 
as· given effectively told the jury that defendant was 
bound under any and a~l circumstances not only to suc-
ce-ed in passing the p·ace Buick, but also to return to his 
right hand side of the highway before the Mitchell truck 
was within one hundred feet of him. The instruction 
went still further and told the jury that Van Patten was 
negligent as a matter of lOJW in failing to conform to the 
statute, and that he was liable to the plaintiff. The 
statute was applied in such form as to make defendant 
an absolute guarantor of plaintiff's safety under any and 
all conditions, plaintiff's own negligence notwithstand-
ing. The instruction as given is illustrative of the harm-
ful effect of injecting the terms of a statute in the ab-
stract without qualifying it where there is evidence of 
unusual or excusable circumstances. 
'This court has frequently held that it is error to 
give abstract propor~ions of law not applicable to the 
facts and circumstances of the case. In other words, the 
trial court should adopt its instructions to the evidence 
and so connect the pToposition of law with. the evidence 
as to lead the jury to make the prop·er app[ication there-
of; otherwise, the law, although correctly stated in the 
abstract, nevertheless may he faulty in that the law as 
stated may not be correctly applied to the evidence. 
Everts v. Worrell, 58 Utah 238, 197 Pac. 1043. 
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In Je·nsen v. Utah Ry. Co., 7-2 Utah 366, 270 Pac. 
349, the court at page 385 of the Utah Report criticizes 
instructions, \Yhich "~hile correct as abstract p~roposi­
tions, are a.t f~ult ''in stating propositions * * * unre-
lated and unrestricted to and regardless of conditions or 
circurnstances.'' Said the court: 
''As a general rule a trial court should not. 
leave the jury to apply mere general principles of 
lR\V to a case, as here \Yas done by the defendant's 
requests. The court should give the jury what 
the la""' is as applied to the facts either stated or 
assumed, and if so found by the jury. The rule 
is well set-tled that instructing a jury, a mere ab~ 
stract or general statement as to the law should 
be avoided, and that all instructions should he ap-
plicable to evidence on either one or the other 
of the respective theories of the pnrties. In-
structions which are not so applicable, though 
abstractly they may be correct, are. not helpful 
to the jury, are apt to be misleading and to he 
improperly app~ied. '' 
The court's instruction No. 7 should at least have 
been qualified so as to appiy the statute to the evidence 
and eliminate defendants' negligence, if the jury found-
the conditions to he such that Mr. Van Patten was 
reasonably mis1ed, or if they found from the ·evidence 
that plaintiff was guilty of negligence which p-roximately 
contributed to the accident. 
In our ori~nal brief, we pointed out that the instruc-
tion was also erroneous in that it ·eliminated contribu-
tory negligence. We do not claim that it is always neces-
sary to qualify every instruction given by the court by 
negativing contributory negligence, except when plain-
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tiff requests or the court gives a formu1a instruction 
which_ purports to state all of the conditions of recovery. 
Plaintiff-'s requested instructions should not be so 
drawn as to not purport in and of themselves to state 
all the conditions essential to recovery; or if they do, 
then all conditions should be covered; otherwise the jury 
is likely to be misled. The fact that other instructions 
may correctly state the law only creates an irreconcilab~e 
conflict, making it impossible to determine which in-
struction the jury followed. In that sense, defendant is 
deprived of a substantial right, which presumably op-
erates to his prejudice. Sorenson v. Bell, 51 Utah 262, 
170 Pac. 72; Sto;t'e v. Green, 6 Pac. (2d) 177, 78 Utah 580; 
Martl:in v. Sheffield~, (Utah) 189 Pac. (2d) 127. 
Evidence of Plaintiff's Negligence 
Respondent's criticism of Van Patten's testimony is 
unjust. This is particularly true as to the discrepan-
cies as to exact distances and the speed of respective 
vehicles involved. Some p·eople are better acquainted 
with exact measurements than others. In automobi!le 
accidents, where objects are on the move, no one is cap-
able of stating exact distances, because no actual meas-
urements were or could have been taken. If V ali Patten 
told Deputy Smith that the Mitchell car was twenty-
five feet from him, he undou,btedly had in mind as of the 
time instant when he saw the vehicles were going to col-
lide in the borrow pit. The physical facts considered in 
the light of Mr. p·ace's testimony and that of Van Pat-
ten necessarily show the distance was somewhere around 
one hundried fifty to two hundred feet, more or less, when 
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, .. an J>atten first sa"~ plaintiff's truck erossing the high-
\vay diagonally toward the northeast. 
The same can be said as to exact distances at which 
the impact occurred east of the highway, and as to the 
exact speed of the 1\fitchel'l truck. 'Tan Patten's best 
estiinate of Mitchell's speed ""as that he was moving 
about the same as defendant's truck. The pictures in-
troduced by plaintiff sho·w· the in1pact was well ·east of 
the paved portion of the high"~ay. 
''Tith reference to 'ran Patten's statement that the 
left front of the ~fitchell truck came in contact with 
the right front of defendant's truck, and that both moved 
a short distance in the direction in which they were 
headed is not inconsistent with any law of physics, when 
it is considered these trucks came together at practically 
right angles (See defendants' Exhibit 6 and the pictures 
introduced by plaintiff). 
Nor was Van Patten's conclusion that he thought 
neither he, nor _Mitchell was to blame for the accident 
determinative of the issues of fact in· this case. The 
questions asked by counse~ for respondent in cross-ex-
amination in that connection improperly called for the 
opinion of the witness on issues clearly for the jury to 
determine. Van Patten undoubtedly felt the dust storm 
had been responsible to a certain extent in creating the 
situation, but the ultimate issue as to whether Mitchell 
was negligent was properly for the jury to decide. 
Counsel also attempts to minimize the testimony of 
the witness Pace. Mr. Pace's best judgment as to the 
position of the Mitchell truck when he first saw it was 
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that ''it was about in the center of the highway or prob-
ably straddled on the center or yellow line of the high-
way when I saw it." (Tr. 472). The fact that he, Pace, 
could not judge exactly how many feet it was on one side 
or the other of the center line did not restrict the jury 
in believing from his testimony that it was crossing the 
centeT line when he first saw it, just 1as it was so he:aded 
when Van Patten first saw, it. 
It must be rememhered that Van Patten was com-
ing out of the dust area. There is evidence that he could 
see two hundred yards or more. There is evidence that 
no traffic within view was approaching from the opposite 
direction on his, that is the east side of the highway at 
the time Van P·atten pulled out to pass. He was not 
expecting cars to come from the west side of the high-
way, but he did not observe any on the paved portion 
on that side. At that instant, plaintiff's truck suddenly 
appeared, cutting diagonally across the highway ap-
proximately twenty-five to fifty yards ahead of the Pace 
automobile. Plaintiff could have been on the west 
shoulder for sometime trying to get his hearings. Wii-
liam M. Mitchell, plaintiff's father, admitted he was wor-
ried ''for fear we would get one side or the other off 
the road.'' Under this state of the evidence, the jury 
could reasonably find that Mitchell had gotten lost west 
of the paved portion of the highway and cut out in 
front of the approaching traffic, and that Van Patten 
was reasonably misled thereby. Even if they found that 
Van Patten was not reasonably misled, the jury could 
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find fron1 the evidence that plaintiff 'vas guilty of con-
tributory neg1igence. 
The jury could also reasonably conclude fro1n the 
evidence that the e1nergency 'vas created through the 
negligence of ~fitchell. 
Upon this basis, ''"e bUbinit that the court's instruc-
tions No. 6 and No. 7 were prejudicial to defendants' 
substantial rights in that they effectively told the jury 
that defendants 'vere liable notwithstanding defendants' 
theory of the evidence. 
Whether plaintiff had sufficient opportunity to avoid 
a collision after discovery of the perilous situation was, 
've submit, also an issue for the jury, as was Mitche~l's 
failure to slow do"\vn or stop in the dust storm, if he 
could not see ahead as he claimed. These issues were 
tendered by defendants' requested instructions No. 9 
and No. 18, discussed at pages 50 to ·5·2 of our original 
brief. They were not covered by the court's instruc~ 
tions, and defendants were entitled to have the jury 
instructed on those issues. 
It is no answer that some instructions were given 
on other issues of contributory negligence. D·efendants 
were entitled to have all of the issues submitted to the 
jury under their theory of the evidence. 
OT'HER .AS!SIGNMENTS OF E'RRO·R 
While in order to avoid undue repetition, we have 
not again discussed each individual assignment of error 
outlined in our original brief, it is not our intention to 
waiv-e any of the errors so assigned. 
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CONCLU·SION 
We were surprised and shocked, during the trial of 
this case, that the trial court refused to give any con- ' 
sideration to our repeated petitions to he heard on our 
objections to the us·e of the annuity tables, particu1arly 
when this court had issued the warning announced in 
the Pauley case. That the tables were effectively used 
to the prejudice of defendants without any foundation 
laid and without any evidence whatsoever to justify their 
use is, we submit, clearly shown by the record. 
Plaintiff had no purpose in using them over our re-
peated objections other than to get an excessive verdict 
and he ran reckless chances in so doing to the injury 
and prejudice of defendants. 
We also submit that the instructions given by 
the court at plaintiff's request were erroneous and pre-
judicial to the substantial rights of the defendants in the 
trial of the factual issues involv-ed in this. case. 
We respectful1y request that the judgment in this 
case be reversed and that a new trial be granted with 
instructions that the annuity tables he excluded from 
the evidence and that proper instructions be submitted 
to the jury upon the issues of negligence and contribu-
tory neglige!lce upon all of the issues. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEWART, CANNON & HANS:ON 
E. F. BALD~WIN, J~R. 
Attorneys for De fend(lfYI)tiS 
and A ppellam;t s 
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